Planning for the Gray Zone: The Yemen Quagmire

Planning for the Gray Zone: The Yemen Quagmire (MES Insights v9i4 August 2018)

by Adam C Seitz

The conflict in Yemen is in its fourth year, and by many assessments warring factions appear to be locked in a stalemate. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and their coalition partners are engaged in a campaign on the Red Sea coast to break the stalemate, shift the balance of forces in their favor, and secure maritime traffic. Secessionist factions, government-allied forces, and various local militias are competing to consolidate gains in the south and east of the county. The US and its allies have continued to pursue a counterterrorism campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in Yemen. The complexity of Yemen’s multifaceted conflict is emblematic of the international security environment and the types of intersecting conflicts that policymakers and military planners face when advancing US national security interests and meeting the challenges posed by revisionist actors in the gray zone. ............(Read on)..............

Avoiding Yemen's Abyss

Avoiding Yemen's Abyss (MES Insights v6i1 February 2015)

by Adam C. Seitz

The January 22, 2015 resignation of the government of Yemeni President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi and the ensuing chaos have once again sparked both fears of the collapse of the Republic of Yemen as we know it and concerns about the effectiveness of international counterterrorism efforts in Yemen. The same combination of elite competition, military factionalization, and ever-shifting alliances that contributed to Yemen’s current political crisis and insecurity continue to provide al-Qaeda with a foothold in Yemen. Any counterterrorism strategy by the U.S. and its international partners must take such factors into consideration, or risk further internationalizing the Yemeni crisis and plunging deeper into Yemen’s counterterrorism abyss.............(Read on)..............

Houthi Advances in Yemen Pose Security Dilemma for the U.S.

Houthi Advances in Yemen Pose Security Dilemma for the U.S. (MES Insights v5i6 November 2014)

by Adam C. Seitz

In July 2014, the northern Yemeni city of Amran fell to insurgents led by Abdul-Maik al-Houthi. Amran had served as the capital for the elders of the influential Hashid tribal confederation since the 1962 Republican Revolution. Less than two months after the capture of Amran, Houthi militias swept into Sanaa, seizing a number of government buildings and military installations, setting up checkpoints throughout the Yemeni capital, and ultimately forcing the Yemeni government led by President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi to sign the “Peace and Partnership” agreement on September 21, 2014. This in effect created a new political order in Yemen. In the two months following the agreement, the Houthis have captured a number of strategically important cities, including the port city of Hudaydah, and have advanced on a number of others controlled by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its local affiliate Ansar alSharia (AAS).

Since 2002, U.S. efforts to disrupt, dismantle and ultimately destroy al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Yemen have relied upon a combination of partnership with the Yemeni military that includes capacity building of Yemeni security forces and U.S. airstrikes. Although the Houthis and the U.S. share a common enemy in AQAP and AAS, this does not equate to a situation in which the enemy of my enemy is my friend. On the contrary, the military and political gains made by the Houthis have created a new set of challenges for counterterrorism efforts in Yemen by the United States and its allies.......(Read on).............

Limitations of the " Yemen Model " to Counterterrorism

Limitations of the " Yemen Model " to Counterterrorism (MES Insights v5i5 September 2014)

by Adam C. Seitz

On 10 September 2014, U.S. President Barak Obama addressed the nation to lay out his administration’s strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant].” To this end President Obama proposed a counterterrorism strategy that relied on a “systematic campaign of airstrikes” and an “increase in support to forces fighting these terrorists on the ground.” Comparing his strategy for ISIL to counterterrorism campaigns in Yemen and Somalia President Obama stated that, “This strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines, is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years.”

President Obama’s use of Yemen and Somalia as models for a strategy against ISIL has once again reignited the debate on the overall effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism strategy in both cases. In the case of the “Yemen Model,” a strategy, which has relied upon a combination of airstrikes and support for local forces, has thus far fallen short of the ultimate objective of destroying al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its local affiliate Ansar al-Sharia (AAS). Indeed, most intelligence and think-tank estimates point to an increase in the number of attacks and the size of AQAP in recent years. This is not to say that U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been completely ineffective, but rather that U.S. efforts have been limited by realities on the ground, especially those contributing to a lack of reliable and effective local partners. Understanding how the political and security environment in Yemen have limited U.S. counterterrorism efforts against AQAP may be useful in managing expectations as the U.S. seeks to duplicate the successes of the “Yemen Model” in Iraq and Syria.............(Read on)..........

Building Yemen's Maritime Security Capacity

Building Yemen's Maritime Security Capacity (MES Insights v5i2 April 2014)

by Adam C Seitz

Over the past decade smuggling across the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb has risen steadily. The illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people continues to fuel sectarian and political violence, threatening Yemen's fragile political transition. At the same time, with a coastline stretching almost 2,000 km along some of the world most strategic waterways, Yemen's continued internal instability and insecurity perpetuates international concerns that Yemen may become a regional hub for transnational smuggling, piracy, and terrorism, posing a significant threat to the free flow of international trade and international security. As such, building the capacity of Yemen's maritime security forces should be a top priority, not only for the Yemeni government but for the international community as a whole.....(Read on).....

In Yemen, “If Not Drones, Then What?”

In Yemen, “If Not Drones, Then What?” (MES Insights v4i6 December 2013)

by Adam C. Seitz

The use of unmanned drones for the targeted killing of suspected terrorists remains a hotly debated topic among academics, human rights groups, and policymakers alike. Drone strikes following the December 4th 2013 attack on the Yemeni Defense Ministry have reinvigorated the debate, especially as the Yemeni government’s security committee and local officials appear divided on the details of the December 12th drone strike. Much of the debate continues to revolve around the legality of extrajudicial targeted killings and the associated collateral damage, including civilian causalities, rising anti-Americanism and the undercutting of Yemen’s political transition. Such arguments, however, miss the mark when it comes to the overall effectiveness of drones when compared to the alternatives, and fail to put forth a convincing answer to the question: “If not drones, then what?” The reality in a case like Yemen, at least in the near-to-medium term, is that no viable alternative options exist for combating Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its affiliates, especially given the post-2011 political and security environment.........(Read on)............

Military Restructuring and Yemen’s Stalled Transition

Military Restructuring and Yemen’s Stalled Transition (MES Insights v3i6 November 2012)

by Adam C. Seitz

One year ago, on November 23, 2011, President Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, ending his 33-year presidency and transferring power to then-Vice President Abd Rabu Mansour Hadi as the first step in Yemen’s transition. Nearly one year after Saleh signed the GCC Initiative, the preparatory committee for national dialogue announced that Yemen’s Conference for National Dialogue had been pushed back to early 2013. The Dialogue is an essential element of the Initiative aimed at unifying a deeply divided country and laying the foundation for the drafting of a new constitution. The November announcement marked the latest delay since the April 2012 date for National Dialogue was first announced, highlighting the challenges Yemen still faces moving forward with implementing the GCC Initiative. One barrier that continues to stand in the way of National Dialogue, and further implementation of the Initiative as a whole, is the restructuring of the armed forces. Although the restructuring of the Yemeni armed forces is stipulated as a part of the first phase of the GCC Initiative, ambiguity within the document has left room for Saleh’s relatives to maintain their posts in the military in post-Saleh Yemen............(Read on)..........

Yemen’s Coming Crisis

Yemen’s Coming Crisis (MES Insights v2i2 March 2011)

by Adam C. Seitz

Following the successful ousting of Presidents Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, anti-government protests continue to challenge the rule of long-standing regimes throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The 32-year rule of Yemen’s President Ali Abdallah Saleh is no exception. Widespread corruption, growing economic and resource inequality, and internal fragmentation have pushed anti-government protesters into the streets demanding the immediate ouster of President Saleh, challenging the stability of a country already on the brink of becoming a failed state.

Even before Yemen was swept up by the wave of protests rolling through the region, the Saleh regime had been faced with a number of daunting challenges: a slew of economic and social issues, the Islamist al-Houthi rebellion in the north, a resilient secessionist movement in the south, and a resurgent al-Qaeda offshoot seeking to take advantage of Yemen’s domestic conflicts and demographics.

In the past, Saleh has been relatively effective in managing the issues his regime has faced through power-sharing arrangements brokered with various tribal leaders, Islamist groups and political factions. Recently, however, shifting alliances have put this system to the test.........(Read on).........